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Continuous-variable (CV) quantum key distribution (QKD) employs the quadratures of a bosonic
mode to establish a secret key between two remote parties, and this is usually achieved via a
Gaussian modulation of coherent states. The resulting secret key rate depends not only on the
loss and noise in the communication channel, but also on a series of data processing steps that
are needed for transforming shared correlations into a final string of secret bits. Here we consider
a Gaussian-modulated coherent-state protocol with homodyne detection in the general setting of
composable finite-size security. After simulating the process of quantum communication, the output
classical data is post-processed via procedures of parameter estimation, error correction, and privacy
amplification. In particular, we analyze the high signal-to-noise regime which requires the use of
high-rate (non-binary) low-density parity check codes. We implement all these steps in a Python-
based library that allows one to investigate and optimize the protocol parameters to be used in
practical experimental implementations of short-range CV-QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
In quantum key distribution (QKD), two authenti-
cated parties (Alice and Bob) aim at establishing a secret
key over a potentially insecure quantum channel [1]. The
security of QKD is derived from the laws of quantum
mechanics, namely the uncertainty principle or the no-
cloning theorem [2, 3]. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard
introduced the first QKD protocol [4], in which informa-
tion is encoded on a property of a discrete-variable (DV)
system, such as the polarization of a photon. This class of
protocols started the area of DV-QKD and their security
has been extensively studied [1, 5].
Later on, at the beginning of the 2000s, a more mod-
ern family of protocols emerged, in which information
is encoded in the position and momentum quadratures
of a bosonic mode [6, 7]. These continuous-variable
(CV) QKD protocols are particularly practical and cost-
effective, being already compatible with the current
telecommunication technology [1, 8]. CV-QKD protocols
are very suitable to reach high rates of communication
(e.g. comparable with the ultimate channel limits [9])
over distances that are compatible with metropolitan ar-
eas [10]. Recently, CV-QKD protocols have also been
shown to reach very long distances, comparable to those
of DV protocols [11, 12].
In a basic CV-QKD protocol, Alice encodes a classi-
cal variable in the coherent states of a bosonic mode via
Gaussian modulation. These states are then transmit-
ted to Bob via the noisy communication channel. At
the output, Bob measures the received states via ho-
modyne [6, 11] (or heterodyne [7]) detection in order
to retrieve Alice’s encoded information. In the worst-
case scenario, all the loss and noise present in the chan-
nel is ascribed to a malicious party (Eve) who tries to
intercept the states and obtain information about the
key. By carefully estimating Eve’s perturbation, Alice
and Bob can apply procedures of error correction (EC)
to remove noise from their data, and then privacy am-
plification (PA), which makes their error-corrected data
completely secret.
In this work, we consider the basic CV-QKD proto-
col based on Gaussian modulation of coherent states and
homodyne detection. Starting from a simulation of the
quantum communication in typical noisy conditions, we
process the generated data into a finite-size secret key
which is composably secure against collective Gaussian
attacks. Besides developing the technical procedure step-
by-step, we implement it in an open-access Python li-
brary associated with this paper [13]. In particular, our
procedure for data processing is based on the composable
secret key rate developed in Ref. [14, Sec. III].
In order to address a short-range regime with relatively
high values of the signal to noise ratio (SNR), the step of
EC is based on high-rate (non-binary) low-density par-
ity check codes (LDPC) [15–19], whose decoding is per-
formed by means of a suitable iterative sum-product al-
gorithm [16, 20] (even though the min-sum algorithm [21]
can be used as an alternative). After EC, the procedure
of PA is based on universal hash functions [22]. Because
of the length of the generated strings can be substantial,
techniques with low complexity are preferred, so that we
use the Toeplitz-based hash function, which is simple,
parallelizable and can moreover be accelerated by using
the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [23].
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II we start
with the description of the coherent-state protocol in-
cluding a realistic model for the detector setup. After an
initial analysis of its asymptotic security, we discuss the
steps of parameter estimation (PE), EC and PA, ending
with the composable secret key rate of the protocol. In
Sec. III, we go into further details of the protocol simula-
tion and data processing, also presenting the pseudocode
for the entire process. In Sec. IV we provide numerical
results that are obtained by our Python library in simu-


















FIG. 1: Structure of a CV-QKD protocol with (Gaussian-
modulated) coherent states considering a receiver that might
have trusted levels of inefficiency and electronic noise. In the
middle, the thermal-loss channel is induced by the collective
Gaussian attack of Eve, who uses a beam splitter with trans-
missivity T and a TMSV state with variance ω. Eve’s outputs
are stored in quantum memories (QM) for a later quantum
measurement, whose optimal performance is bounded by the
Holevo information.
II. COHERENT-STATE PROTOCOL AND
SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. General description and mutual information
Assume that Alice prepares a bosonic mode A in a co-
herent state |α〉 whose amplitude is Gaussian-modulated
(see Fig. 1 for a schematic). In other words, we may
write α = (q + ip)/2, where x = q, p is the mean value
of the generic quadrature x̂ = q̂, p̂, which is randomly
chosen according to a zero-mean Gaussian distribution
N (0, σ2x) with variance σ2x := µ − 1 ≥ 0, i.e., according
to the Gaussian probability density








Note that we have q = 2Reα and p = 2 Imα (in fact, we
use the notation of Ref. [8, Sec. II], where [q̂, p̂] = 2i and
the vacuum state has noise-variance equal to 1). Then,
σ2x represents the modulation variance while µ is the total
signal variance (including the vacuum noise).
The coherent state is sent through an optical fiber
of length L, which can be modelled as a thermal-loss
channel with transmissivity T = 10−
AL
10 (e.g., A =
0.2 dB/km) and thermal noise ω = 2n̄ + 1, where n̄
is the thermal number associated with an environmen-
tal mode E. The process can equivalently be represented
by a beam splitter with transmissivity T mixing Alice’s
mode A with mode E, which is in a thermal state with n̄
mean photons. The environmental thermal state can be
purified in a two-mode squeezed vacuum state (TMSV)
ΦeE , i.e., a Gaussian state for modes e and E, with zero






ω2 − 1Z ωI
)
, (2)
where I := diag(1, 1) and Z := diag(1,−1). This dilation
based on a beamsplitter and a TMSV state is known
as an “entangling cloner” attack and represents a real-
istic collective Gaussian attack [24] (see Fig. 1). Recall
that the class of collective Gaussian attacks is optimal
for Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD protocols [1].
At the other end of the channel, Bob measures the
incoming state using a homodyne detector with quantum
efficiency η and electronic noise υel (we may also include
local coupling losses in parameter η). The detector is
randomly switched between the two quadratures. Let us
denote by ŷ the generic quadrature of Bob’s mode B just
before the (ideal) homodyne detector. Then, the outcome




where z is (or approximately is) a Gaussian noise variable
with zero mean and variance
σ2z = 1+ υel + ηT ξ, (4)
with υel being the electronic noise of the setup and ξ is




(ω − 1). (5)
Here it is important to make two observations. The
first consideration is about the general treatment of the
detector at Bob’s side, where we assume the potential
presence of trusted levels of quantum efficiency and elec-
tronic noise. In the worst-case scenario, these levels can
be put equal to zero and assume that these contribu-
tions are implicitly part of the channel transmissivity
and excess noise. In other words, one has Tη → T in
Eq. (3), while υel becomes part of ξ in Eq. (4), so that
ξ → ξ + υel/T in Eq. (5). The second point is that
there might be other imperfections in Alice’s and Bob’s
setups that are not mitigated or controllable by the par-
ties (e.g., modulation and phase noise). These imperfec-
tions are automatically included in the channel loss and
noise via the general relations of Eqs. (3) and (4). Fur-
themore, the extra noise contributions can be considered
to be Gaussian in the worst-case scenario, resorting to
the optimality of Gaussian attacks in CV-QKD [1].
Assuming the general scenario in Fig. 1, let us compute
Alice and Bob’s mutual information. From Eq. (3), we






= Tη(µ− 1 + ξ) + 1 + υel. (6)
For the conditional variance, we compute
σ2y|x = σ
2
y(µ = 1) = ηT ξ + 1 + υel. (7)
The mutual information associated with the CVs x and y
is given by the difference between the differential entropy
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h(y) of y and the conditional entropy h(y|x), i.e.,





















log2 [1 + SNR] . (10)
The mutual information has the same value no matter
if it is computed in direct reconciliation (DR), where
Bob infers Alice’s variable, or reverse reconciliation (RR),
where Alice infers Bob’s variable.
As we can see from the expression above, the mutual
information contains the signal-to-noise (SNR) term
SNR = (µ− 1)/X , (11)
where
X = ξ + (1 + υel)/Tη (12)
is known as equivalent noise. The joint Gaussian distri-










where ρ = E(xy)/σxσy is a correlation parameter (here E
denotes the expected value). From the classical formula






It is important to stress that, in order to asymptoti-
cally achieve the maximum number of shared bits I(x : y)
per channel use in RR, Bob needs to send h(y|x) bits
through the public channel according to Slepian-Wolf
coding [26, 27]. In practice, Alice and Bob will perform
a suboptimal procedure of EC/reconciliation revealing
more information leakEC ≥ h(y|x). To account for this,
one assumes that only a portion βI(x : y) of the mutual
information can be achieved by using the reconciliation
parameter β ∈ [0, 1). This is crucial parameter that de-
pends on various technical quantities as we will see later.
In the ideal case of perfect reconciliation (β = 1), the
mutual information between the parties depends mono-
tonically on the SNR. However, in a realistic case where
the reconciliation is not efficient (β < 1), the extra leaked
information (1 − β)I(x : y) also depends on the SNR.
Therefore, by trying to balance the terms βI(x : y) and
leakEC = h(y|x) + (1 − β)I(x : y), one finds an optimal
value for the SNR and, therefore, an optimal value for the
total signal variance µ. In practice, this optimal work-
ing point can be precisely computed only after T and ξ
are estimated through the procedure of PE (which is dis-
cussed later in Sec. II C). However, a rough estimate of
this optimal value can be obtained by an educated guess
of the channel parameters (e.g., the approximate trans-
missivity could be guessed from the length of the fiber
and the expected standard loss rate).
B. Asymptotic key rate
Let us compute the secret key rate that the parties
would be able to achieve if they could use the quantum
communication channel an infinite number of times. Be-
sides βI(x : y), we need to calculate Eve’s Holevo in-
formation χ(E : y) on Bob’s outcome y. This is in fact
the maximum information that Eve can steal under the
assumption of collective attacks, where she perturbs the
channel in a independent and identical way, while storing
all her outputs in a quantum memory (to be optimally
measured at the end of the protocol). It is important
to stress that, for any processing done by Bob y → y′,
we have χ(E : y′) ≤ χ(E : y) so that the latter value
can always be taken as an upper bound for the actual
eavesdropping performance.
Let us introduce the entanglement-based representa-
tion of the protocol, where Alice’s input ensemble of co-
herent states is generated on mode A by heterodyning
mode A′ of a TMSV ΦA′A with variance µ. Note that
this representation is not strictly necessary in our anal-
ysis (which may be carried over in prepare and measure
completely), but we adopt it anyway for completeness, so
as to give the total state with all the correlations between
Alice, Bob and Eve.
The output modes A′ and B shared by the parties will







where we have set
c :=
√
Tη(µ2 − 1), (16)
b := Tη(µ+ ξ) + 1− Tη + υel. (17)
Then, the global output state ρA′BeE′ of Alice, Bob and




µI cZ 0 ζZ
cZ bI γZ θI
0 γZ ωI ψZ
ζZ θI ψZ φI

 , (18)
where 0 is the 2× 2 zero matrix and we set
γ :=
√
η(1 − T )(ω2 − 1), (19)
ζ := −
√
(1− T )(µ2 − 1), (20)
θ :=
√
ηT (1− T )(ω − µ), (21)
ψ :=
√
T (ω2 − 1), (22)
φ := Tω + (1− T )µ. (23)
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To compute the Holevo bound, we need to derive the
von Neumann entropies S(ρeE′) and S(ρeE′|y) which can
be computed from the symplectic spectra of the reduced











we may use the pseudo-inverse to compute [8]
VeE′|y = VeE′ −CT [Π(bI)Π]−1C (25)












Since both VeE′ and VeE′|y are two-mode CMs, it is easy
to compute their symplectic spectra, that we denote by
{ν±} and {ν̃±}, respectively. Their general analytical
expressions are too cumbersome to show here unless we
take the limit µ ≫ 1. For instance, we have ν+ → (1 −
T )µ and ν− → ω.
Finally, we may write the Holevo bound as
χ(E : y) = S(ρeE′)− S(ρeE′|y)














The asymptotic key rate is given by
Rasy = βI(x : y)− χ(E : y) (30)
= R(β, µ, η, υel, T, ξ). (31)
Suppose that η and υel are known and the parties have
preliminary estimates of T and ξ. Then, for a target β,
Alice can compute an optimal value µopt for the signal
variance µ by optimizing the asymptotic rate in Eq. (31).
C. Parameter estimation
In a realistic implementation of the protocol, the par-
ties use the quantum channel a finite number N of times.
The first consequence of this finite-size scenario is that
their knowledge of the channel parameters T and ξ is
not perfect. Thus, once the quantum communication is
over, Alice and Bob declare m random instances {xi}
and {yi} of their local variables x and y. From these in-
stances, they build the maximum-likelihood estimators T̂
of the transmissivity T and Ξ̂ of the excess noise variance
Ξ := ηT ξ, for which they also exploit their knowledge of
the trusted levels of detector/setup efficiency η and elec-
tronic noise υel.















is the estimator for the covarianceCxy =
√
ηTσ2x between
x and y. This covariance is normally distributed with
following mean and variance
E(Ĉxy) =
√













:= VCxy . (35)













VCxy follows a standard normal distribution.
The mean and variance of T̂ is given by the associated


























Using Eqs. (34) and (35), and keeping only the significant
terms with respect to 1/m, we have









:= σ2T . (39)












Assuming T̂ ≈ T and rescaling by 1/σz the term inside
the brackets in the relation above, we get a standard
normal distribution for the variable ziσz with zi = yi −√











and observe that this is a (scaled) chi-squared variable.
From the associated chi-squared parameters k = m (and












Then, from the formula
σ2z = 1 + vel + Ξ, (44)
we have that
Ξ̂ = σ̂2z − υel − 1, (45)








For m sufficiently large, and up to an error probability
εPE, the channel parameters fall in the intervals
T ∈ [T̂ − wσT̂ , T̂ + wσT̂ ], (48)
Ξ ∈ [Ξ̂− wσΞ̂, Ξ̂ + wσΞ̂], (49)
where σT̂ , σΞ̂ are given by the Eq. (39) and (47), where
we replace the actual values T and σ2z with their corre-
sponding estimators. Note that w is expressed in terms
of εPE via the inverse error function, i.e.,
w =
√
2 erf−1(1 − εPE). (50)
The worst-case estimators will be given by
Tm = T̂ − wσT̂ , Ξm = Ξ̂ + wσΞ̂ (51)
so we have T ≥ Tm and Ξ ≤ Ξm up to an error εPE (see
Appendix A for other details on the derivation of Tm).
In the next step, Alice and Bob compute an overesti-
mation of Eve’s Holevo bound in terms of Tm and Ξm,
so that they may write the modified rate
Rm := βI(x : y)− χ(E : y)|Tm,Ξm . (52)
Accounting for the number of signals sacrificed for PE,






where n = N −m are the instances for key generation.
Note that, from the estimators T̂ and Ξ̂, the parties
may compute an estimator for the SNR, i.e.,
ŜNR =
(µ− 1)ηT̂
1 + υel + Ξ̂
. (54)
Therefore, in a more practical implementation, the rate
in Eq. (52) is replaced by the following expression
Rm = β I(x : y)|T̂ ,Ξ̂ − χ(E : y)|Tm,Ξm , (55)








For a fixed β, the parties could potentially optimize the
SNR over the signal variance µ. In fact, before the quan-
tum communication, they may use rough estimates about
transmissivity and excess noise to compute value µopt(β)
that maximizes the asymptotic key rate.
In a practical implementation, the data generated by
the QKD protocol is sliced in nbks ≫ 1 blocks, each block
being associated with the quantum communication of N
points (modes). Assuming that the channel is sufficiently
stable over time, the statistics (estimators and worst-case
values) can be computed over
M := mnbks ≫ m (57)
random instances, so that all the estimators (i.e, T̂ , Ξ̂,
ŜNR, Tm, and Ξm) are computed over M points and we
replace Rm → RM in Eq. (55), i.e., we consider
RM = β I(x : y)|T̂ ,Ξ̂ − χ(E : y)|TM ,ΞM , (58)
This also means that we consider an average of m =
M/nbks points for PE in each block, and an average num-
ber of n = N −M/nbks key generation points from each
block to be processed in the step of EC. Because N is
typically large, the variations around the averages can
be considered to be negligible, which means that we may
assume m and n to be the actual values for each block.
Finally note that, if the channel instead varies over
a timescale comparable to the block size N (which is a
condition that may occur in free-space quantum commu-
nications [14, 29]), then we may need to perform PE inde-
pendently for each block. In this case, one would have a
different rate for each block, so that the final key rate will
be given by an average. However, for ground-based fiber-
implementations, the channel is typically stable over long
times, which is the condition assumed here.
D. Error correction
Once PE has been done, the parties process their
remaining n pairs (key generation points) in a proce-
dure of EC. Here we combine elements from various
works [16, 19, 21, 30, 31]. The procedure can be broken
down in steps of normalization, discretization, splitting,
LDPC encoding/decoding, and EC verification.
1. Normalization
In each block of size N , Alice and Bob have n pairs
{xi, yi} of their variables x and y that are related by
Eq. (3) and can be used for key generation. As a first
step, Alice and Bob normalize their variables by dividing
them by the respective standard deviations, i.e., [21]
x→ X := x/σx, y → Y := y/σy, (59)








Variables X and Y follow a standard normal bivariate
distribution with correlation ρ = E(XY ), which is con-
nected to the SNR by Eq. (14), where the latter is ap-
proximated by Eq. (54) in a practical scenario.
Under conditions of stability for the quantum com-
munication channel, the normalization in Eq. (59) is
performed over the entire record of nnbks key genera-
tion points. Using the computed standard deviations
σx and σy , we then build the strings X
n = xn/σx and
Y n = yn/σy for each block, starting from the correspond-
ing n key generation points xn = {xi} and yn = {yi}.
2. Discretization
Bob discretizes his normalized variable Y in a p-ary
variable K with generic value κ ∈ {0, . . . , 2p − 1} being
an element of a Galois field GF(2p) (see Appendix B).
This is achieved as follows. As a first step, he sets a
cut-off α such that |Y | ≤ α occurs with negligible proba-
bility, which is approximately true for α ≥ 3. Then, Bob
chooses the size δ = 2α2−p of the intervals (bins) [aκ, bκ)





−∞ for κ = 0,







−α+ (κ+ 1)δ for κ < 2p − 1,
∞ for κ = 2p − 1.
(62)
Finally, for any value of Y ∈ [aκ, bκ), Bob takes K equal
to κ. Thus, for n points, the normalized string Y n is
transformed into a string of discrete values Kn. Note
that this discretization technique is very basic. Indeed
one could increase the performance by adopting bins of
different sizes depending on the estimated SNR.
3. Splitting
Bob sets an integer value for q < p and computes d =
p−q. Then, he splits his discretized variable in two parts
K = (K,K), where the top variable K is q-ary and the
bottom variable K is d-ary. Their values are defined by
splitting the generic value κ in the following two parts
κ =
κ− (κ mod 2d)
2d
, κ = (κ mod 2d). (63)
In other words, we have
κ = κ2d + κ. (64)
With the top variable K, Bob creates 2q super bins with
each super bin containing 2d bins associated with the
bottom variable K. See also Fig. 2.
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FIG. 2: Discretization and splitting with α = 3, p = 3 and q =
2. The variable Y follows a normal distribution PY so that the
probability of |Y | > 3 is assumed to be negligible. Variable Y
and the bins defined in Eqs. (61) and (62) identify a discrete
variable K with values κ = 0, . . . , 7 (black triangles). During
the splitting stage, each bin can be described by two numbers:
κ = 0 . . . , 3 associated with q = 2, and κ = 0, 1 associated
with d = p− q = 1. We see that 2d bins belong to each super
bin κ (colored intervals). Bob uses the parity check matrix of
a non-binary LDPC code to encode the information κ related
to the super bin while the position κ of the bin inside the
super bin is broadcast through the public channel.
Repeating this for n points provides a string of values
K
n
for the super bins and another string for the relative
bin-positions Kn. The most significant string K
n
is lo-
cally processed by an LDPC code (more details below),
while the least significant string Kn is side information
that is revealed through the public channel.
4. LDPC encoding and decoding
Bob constructs an l × n parity check matrix H with
q-ary entries from GF(2q) according to Ref. [30]. This
matrix is applied to the top string K
n
to derive the l-
long syndrome K lsd = HK
n
, where the matrix-vector
product is defined in GF(2q). The syndrome is sent to
Alice together with the direct communication of the bot-
tom string Kn. The parity check matrix is associated
with an LDPC code [16], which may encode k = n − l
source symbols into n output symbols, so that it has rate
Rcode := k/n = 1−Rsyn, Rsyn := l/n. (65)
What value of Rcode to use and, therefore, what matrix
H to build is explained afterwards in this subsection.
From the knowledge of the syndrome K lsd, Bob’s bot-
tom string Kn and her local string Xn, Alice decodes
Bob’s top string K
n
. This is done via an iterative be-
lief propagation algorithm [16] where, in every iteration,
she updates a codeword likelihood function (see also Ap-
pendix C). The initial likelihood function before any it-
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eration comes from the a priori probabilities





















At any iteration ≤ itermax Alice finds the argument that
maximizes the likelihood function. If the syndrome of
this argument is equal to K lsd, then the argument forms
her guess K̂n of Bob’s top string K
n
. However, if this
syndrome matching test (SMT) is not satisfied within the
maximum number of iterations itermax, then the block
is discarded. The possibility of failure in the SMT re-
duces the total number of input blocks from nbks to
nSMT = pSMTnbks where pSMT is the probability of suc-
cessful matching within the established itermax iterations.
Let us compute the LDPC rate Rcode to be used. First
notice how Alice and Bob’s mutual information decreases
as a consequence of the classical data processing inequal-
ity [25] applied to the procedure. We have
I(x : y) ≥ I(X : Y ) (69)
≥ I(X : K) = H(K)−H(K|X) (70)
≥ H(K)− leakEC, (71)
where leakEC ≥ H(K|X) comes from the Wolf-Slepian
limit [26, 27] and H(K) is the Shannon entropy of K,
which can be computed over the entire record of nent =
nnbks key generation points (under stability conditions).
The parties empirically estimate the entropy H(K). To




fκ log2 fκ, (72)
where fκ = nκ/nent stands for the frequencies of the
symbols κ, defined as the ratio between the number of
times nκ that a symbol appears in the string over the
string’s length nent. For this estimator, it is easy to show
that [32]







This bound is valid up to an error probability εent.
In Eq. (71), the leakage leakEC is upper-bounded by
the equivalent number of bits per use that are broadcast
after the LDPC encoding in each block, i.e.
leakEC ≤ d+Rsynq. (75)
Therefore, combining the two previous bounds, we may
write
I(x : y) ≥ βI(x : y) := Ĥ(K)− δent +Rcodeq − p. (76)
Note that in a practical implementation Alice and Bob
do not access I(x : y), but rather I(x : y)|T̂ ,Ξ̂ from
Eq. (56). Therefore, considering this modification in
Eq. (76), we more precisely write
βI(x : y)|T̂ ,Ξ̂ = Ĥ(K)− δent +Rcodeq − p, (77)
so the rate in Eq. (58) becomes
RECM = Ĥ(K)− δent +Rcodeq − p− χ(E : y)|TM ,ΞM .
(78)
From Eqs. (56) and (77), we see that the LDPC code









+ p− Ĥ(K) + δent
]
(79)
for some estimated SNR and key entropy. A value of the
reconciliation efficiency β is acceptable only if we can
choose parameters α ≥ 3 and q [33], such that Rcode ≤ 1.
Once Rcode is known, the sparse parity check matrix H
of the LDPC code can be constructed following Ref. [30].
5. Verification
An important final step in the EC procedure is the
verification of the nSMT error-corrected blocks that have
successfully passed the SMT. For each of these blocks,
the parties possess two n-long q-ary strings with iden-
tical syndromes, i.e., Bob’s top string K
n
and Alice’s





bin, so that each of them is
qn bit long. In the next step, Alice and Bob compute
t-bit long hashes of their converted binary strings follow-
ing Ref. [31] (universal hash functions are used because
of their resistance to collisions). In particular, they set
t = ⌈− log2 εcor⌉, where εcor is known as ‘correctness’.
Then, Bob discloses his hash to Alice, who compares
it with hers. If the hashes are identical, the verification
stage is deemed successful. The two strings K
n
bin and
K̂nbin are identical up to a small error probability 2
−t ≤
εcor. In such a case, the associated bottom string K
n
held by both parties is converted by both parties into









bin → K̂nbinKnbin. Such binary
concatenations are promoted to the next step of PA.
By contrast, if the hashes are different, then the two
postprocessed strings are discarded (together with the
public bottom string). Therefore, associated with the
hash verification test, we have a probability of success
8
that we denote by pver. This is implicitly connected with
εcor. In fact, if we decrease εcor, we increase the length of
the hashes to verify, meaning that we increase the prob-
ability of spotting an uncorrected error in the strings,
leading to a reduction of the success probability pver.
Thus, combining the possible failures in the syndrome
and hash tests, we have a total probability of success for
EC, which is given by
pEC = pSMTpver := 1− pFER, (80)
where pFER is known as ‘frame error rate’ (FER).
Note that the effective value of pEC depends not only
on εcor but also on the specific choice for the LDPC code.
In particular, in the presence of a very noisy channel,
using a high-rate LDPC code (equivalent to a high value
of β) implies low correction performances and, therefore,
a low value for pEC (SMT and/or hash test tend to fail).
By contrast, the use of a low-rate EC code (low value of
β) implies a high value for pEC (good performance for
both SMT and hash test). Thus, there is an implicit
trade-off between pEC and β. For fixed values of εcor and
β, the value of pEC (success of the EC test) still depends
on the channel noise, so that it needs to be carefully
calculated from the experimental/simulation points.
E. Privacy amplification and composably-secure
finite-size key
The final step is that of PA, after which the secret
key is generated. Starting from the original nbks blocks
(each being N -size), the parties derive pECnbks success-





bin ≃ Ŝ := K̂nbinKnbin, (81)
each string containing np bits. In this final step, all
the surviving error-corrected strings are compressed into
shorter strings that are decoupled from Eve (up to a small
error probability that we discuss below). This compres-
sion step can be implemented on each sequence individ-
ually, or globally on a concatenation of sequences. Here,
the latter approach is adopted and is certainly valid un-
der conditions of channel stability.
Concatenating their local pECnbks error-corrected
strings, Alice and Bob construct two long binary se-
quences S ≃ Ŝ, each having ñ := pECnbksnp bits. Each
of these sequences will be compressed to a final secret
key of r := pECnbksnR̃ bits, where R̃ is determined by
the composable key rate (see below). The compression
is achieved via universal hashing by applying a Toeplitz
matrix Tr,ñ which is calculated efficiently with the use
of FFT (more details in Appendix D). Thus, from their
sequences, Alice and Bob finally retrieve the secret key
K = Tr,ñS ≃ Tr,ñŜ. (82)
An important parameter to consider for the step of PA
is the ‘secrecy’ εsec, which bounds the distance between
the final key and an ideal key from which Eve is com-
pletely decoupled. Technically, one further decomposes
εsec = εs + εh, where εs is a smoothing parameter εs and
εh is a hashing parameter. These PA epsilon parameters
are combined with the parameter from EC.
Let us call ρ̃n the classical-classical-quantum state
shared by Alice, Bob and Eve after EC. We may write
pECD(ρ̃
n, ρid) ≤ ε := εsec + εcor, (83)
where ε is the epsilon security of the protocol, D is the
trace distance and ρid is the output of an ideal protocol
where Eve is completely decoupled from Bob, with Alice’s
and Bob’s keys being exactly the same [14, App. G].
Accounting for the estimation of the channel param-
eters [cf. Eq. (51)] and the key entropy [cf. Eq. (73)] is
equivalent to replacing ρ̃n with a worst-case state ρ̃nwc in
the computation of the key rate. However, there is a
small probability ε′PE that we have a different state ρbad
violating one or more of the tail bounds associated with
the worst-case estimators. This means that, on average,
we have the state
ρPE = (1 − ε′PE)ρ̃nwc + ε′PEρbad. (84)
Because we impose pECD(ρ̃
n
wc, ρid) ≤ ε and the previ-
ous equation implies D(ρ̃nwc, ρPE) ≤ ε′PE, the triangle in-
equality provides pECD(ρPE, ρid) ≤ ε+pECε′PE, meaning
that the imperfect parameter estimation adds an extra
term pECε
′
PE to the epsilon security of the protocol. In
other words, we have that the protocol is secure up to
re-defining ε→ ε+ pECε′PE. Note that we have
ε′PE = (1 − 2εPE)εent + (1− εent)2εPE + 2εPEεent (85)
≃ 2εPE + εent, (86)
so we can write
ε = εsec + εcor + pECε
′
PE (87)
≃ εs + εh + εcor + pEC(2εPE + εent). (88)
A typical choice is to set εs = εh = εcor = εPE = εent =
2−32 ≃ 2.3× 10−10, so that ε . 4× 10−9 for any pEC.
For success probability pEC and ε-security against col-
lective (Gaussian) attacks, the secret key rate of the pro-














where RECM is given in Eq. (78) and the extra terms are
equal to the following [34]












Θ := log2[pEC(1− ε2s/3)] + 2 log2
√
2εh. (91)
Note that the discretization bits p appear in ∆AEP [35]
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The practical secret key rate in Eq. (89) can be com-













where p̃EC is guessed, with ∆̃AEP and Θ̃ being computed
on that guess. Then, we have
R∗M = β̃ I(x : y)|T,Ξ − χ(E : y)|T∗M ,Ξ∗M , (93)
where β̃ is also guessed, and the various estimators are
approximated by their mean values, so that T̂ ≃ T , Ξ̂ ≃
Ξ = ηT ξ and we have set
T ∗M = T − wσT , (94)
Ξ∗M = Ξ + wσΞ, (95)
with w depending on εPE as in Eq. (50).
III. PROTOCOL SIMULATION AND DATA
PROCESSING
Here we sequentially go over the steps of the protocol
and its postprocessing, as they need to be implemented in
a numerical simulation or an actual experimental demon-
stration. We provide more technical details and finally
present the pseudocode of the entire procedure.
A. Main parameters
We start by discussing the main parameters related to
the physical setup, communication channel and proto-
col. Some of these parameters are taken as input, while
others need to be estimated by the parties, so that they
represent output values of the simulation.
Setup: Main parameters are Alice’s total signal variance
µ, Bob’s trusted levels of local efficiency η, and elec-
tronic noise υel. These are all input values.
Channel: Main parameters are the effective transmissiv-
ity T , and excess noise ξ. These are input values to
our simulation, which are used to create the input-
output relation of Eq. (3). In an experimental im-
plementation, these values are generally unknown
and Eq. (3) comes from the experimental data.
Protocol: Main parameters are the number of blocks
nbks, the size of each block N , the total number M
of instances for PE, the various epsilon parameters
εs,h,... and the p-bit discretization, so the alphabet
size is D = 2p. These are all input values. Out-
put values are the estimators T̂ , Ξ̂, TM , ΞM , the
EC probability of success pEC, the reconciliation
parameter β, the final rate R and key sting K.
In Tables I and II, we summarize the main input and
output parameters. In Table III, we schematically show
the formulas for other related parameters.
parameter description
L Channel length (km)




β (Target) reconciliation efficiency
nbks Number of blocks
N Block size
M Number of PE runs
p Discretization bits
q Most significant (top) bits
α Phase-space cut-off
itermax Max number of EC iterations
εPE, s, h, corr Epsilon parameters
µ Total signal variance
TABLE I: Main input parameters
parameter description
µopt Optimal signal variance
Rasy Asymptotic key rate
T̂ , Ξ̂, TM , ΞM Channel estimators
ŜNR Estimated SNR
Ĥ(K) Key entropy estimator
Rcode Code rate
pEC EC success probability
fndrnd EC syndrome matching round
r Final key length
R Composable key rate
K Final key
ε ε-security
TABLE II: Main output parameters
B. Quantum communication
The process of quantum communication can be simpli-
fied in the following two steps before and after the action
of the channel:
Preparation: Alice encodes Nnbks instances {xi} of the
mean x of the generic quadrature x̂, such that x ∼
N (0, µ− 1). In the experimental practice, the two
conjugate quadratures are independently encoded
in the amplitude of a coherent state, but only one
of them will survive after the procedure of sifting
(here implicitly assumed).
Measurement: After the channel and the projection of
(a randomly-switched) homodyne detection, Bob
decodes Nnbks instances {yi} of y =
√
Tηx + z,
where the noise variable z ∼ N (0, σ2z) has variance
σ2z as in Eq. (4).
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parameter description formula
T Channel transmissivity 10−AL/10
σ2z Noise variance 1 + vel + ηTξ
Ξ Excess noise variance ηTξ
ω Thermal noise Tξ−T+1
1−T
X Equivalent noise ξ + 1+vel
Tη
SNR Signal-to-noise ratio (µ− 1)/X
m PE instances per block M/nbks
n Key generation points per block N −m
FER Frame error rate 1− pEC
GF Number of the GF elements 2q
δ Lattice step in phase space α
2p−1
d Least significant (bottom) bits p− q





δent Entropy penalty See Eq. (74)
ñ Total bit string length after EC n p nbks pEC
TABLE III: Related parameters
As mentioned above, it is implicitly assumed that Al-
ice and Bob perform a sifting stage where Bob classically
communicates to Alice which quadrature he has mea-
sured (so that the other quadrature is discarded).
C. Parameter estimation
The stage of PE is described by the following steps:
Random positions: Alice randomly picks M positions
i ∈ [1, Nnbks], say {iu}Mu=1. On average m =
M/nbks positions are therefore picked from each
block, and n = N −m points are left for key gen-
eration in each block (for large enough blocks, the
spread around these averages is negligible).
Public declaration: Using a classical channel, Alice
communicates the M pairs {iu, xiu}Mu=1 to Bob.
Estimators: Bob sets a PE error εPE. From the pairs
{xiu , yiu}Mu=1, he computes the estimators T̂ and Ξ̂,
and the worst-case estimators TM and ΞM for the
channel parameters (see formulas in Sec. II C).
Early termination: Bob checks the threshold condi-
tion I(x : y)|T̂ ,Ξ̂ > χ(E : y)|TM ,ΞM , which is com-
puted in terms of the estimators T̂ and Ξ̂, and
worst-case estimators TM and ΞM (associated with
εPE). If the threshold condition is not satisfied,
then the protocol is aborted.
D. Error correction
The procedure of EC is performed on each block of size
N and consists of the following steps:
Normalization: For key generation, Alice and Bob have
n pairs {xi, yi} of their variables x and y that are re-
lated by Eq. (3). As a first step, Alice and Bob nor-
malize their variables x and y according to Eq. (59),
therefore creating X and Y .
Discretization: Bob sets the cut-off value α and the
step δ = α21−p of his lattice, whose generic bin
Y [aκ, bκ) is defined by Eqs. (61) and (62). Then,
he discretizes his normalized variable Y into a p-ary
variable K with generic value κ ∈ {0, . . . , 2p − 1}
with the following rule: For any value of his variable
Y ∈ [aκ, bκ), Bob takes K equal to κ.
Splitting: Bob sets an integer value for q and computes
d = p− q. From his discretized variable K, he cre-
ates the top q-ary variable K and the bottom d-ary
variable K, whose generic values κ and κ are de-
fined by Eq. (63). For n points, he therefore creates
a string K
n
which is locally processed via an LDPC
code (see below), and another string Kn which is
revealed through the public channel.
LDPC encoding: From the SNR estimator ŜNR, the
entropy estimator Ĥ(K), and a target reconcilia-
tion efficiency β, the parties use Eq. (79) to de-
rive the rate Rcode of the LDPC code. They
then build its l × n parity-check matrix H with
q-ary entries from GF(2q), using the procedure of
Ref. [30], i.e., (i) the column weight dv (number
of nonzero elements in a column) is constant and
we set dv = 2; (ii) the row weight dc adapts to the
formula Rcode = 1−dv/dc and is as uniform as pos-
sible; and (iii) the overlap (inner product between
two columns) is never larger than 1. Once H is con-
structed, Bob computes the syndromeK lsd = HK
n
,
which is sent to Alice together with the bottom
string Kn.
LDPC decoding: From the knowledge of the syndrome
K lsd, Bob’s bottom string K
n and her local string
Xn, Alice decodes her guess K̂n of Bob’s top string
K
n
. This is done via a sum-product algorithm [16],
where in each iteration iter < itermax Alice up-
dates a suitable likelihood function with initial
value given by the a priori probabilities in Eq. (68).
If the syndrome of K̂n is equal to K lsd, then Alice’s
guess K̂n of Bob’s top string K
n
is promoted to
the next verification step. If the syndrome match-
ing test fails for itermax iterations, the block is dis-
carded and the frequency/probability 1 − pSMT of
this event is registered. For more details of the
sum-product algorithm see Appendix C.
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Verification: Each pair of promoted strings K
n
and K̂n





the parties compute hashes of t = ⌈− log2 εcor⌉ bits.
Bob discloses his hash to Alice, who compares it
with hers. If the hashes are identical, the parties
convert the corresponding bottom string Kn into





bin ≃ Ŝ := K̂nbinKnbin (96)
to the next step of PA. By contrast, if the hashes





together with Kn. The parties compute the fre-
quency/probability of success of the hash verifica-
tion test pver and derive the overall success prob-
ability of EC pEC = pSMTpver = 1 − pFER. In





ken into Q-bit strings that are converted to Q-ary





n′ = nq/Q symbols for Q > q. In case nq/Q





padded with sq zeros so that n′ = (n+ s)q/Q ∈ N.
Bob then derives independent uniform random in-
tegers vi = 1, . . . , 2
Q∗ − 1, where vi is odd, and an
integer u = 0, . . . , 2Q
∗ − 1, for i = 1, . . . , n′ and
Q∗ ≤ Q + t − 1 with εcor ≤ 2−t being the target
collision probability. After Bob communicates his
choice of universal families to Alice, they both hash
each of the Q-ary numbers and combine the results









where x = K
n′
Q (for Bob) or K̂
n′
Q (for Alice). Sum-
mation and multiplication in Eq. (97) are modulo
2Q
∗
. In practice, this is done by discarding the
overflow (number of bits over Q∗) of h̃ (x). Then
they keep only the first t bits to form the hashes
(where typically t = 32).
E. Privacy amplification
After EC, Alice and Bob are left with pECnbks success-
fully error-corrected binary strings, each of them being
represented by Eq. (96) and containing np bits. By con-
catenation, they build two long binary sequences S ≃ Ŝ,
each having ñ := pECnbksnp bits. For the chosen level of
secrecy εsec, the parties compute the overall epsilon secu-
rity ε from Eq. (88) and the key rate R = npECN R̃ accord-
ing to Eq. (89). Finally, the sequences S ≃ Ŝ are com-
pressed into a final secret key of length r := pECnbksnR̃
bits by applying a Toeplitz matrix Tr,ñ, so the secret key
is given by Eq. (82).
F. Pseudocode of the procedure
In Algorithm 1, we present the entire pseudocode of the
procedure, whose steps are implemented in Python [13].
Algorithm 1 High-Level Routine Overview
1: L,A, η, ξ, vel, nbks, N,M, εPE, εs, εh, εcor, β, itermax, p, q, α←
Input_Values_Definition()
2: T, σ2z ,Ξ,m, n, t,GF, δ, d← Dependent_Values()
3: Validity_Checks()
4: if is_mu_optimal then
















17: T̂ , Ξ̂, TM ,ΞM ← Parameter_Estimation()
18: RM , I(x : y)|T̂ ,Ξ̂ , χ(E : y)|TM ,ΞM ← Rate_Calculation()
19: if I(x : y)|T̂ ,Ξ̂ ≤ χ(E : y)|TM ,ΞM then
20: Abort_Protocol()
21: end if
22: X,Y ← Normalization()
23: ŜNR, ρ← Code_Estimations()
24: for blk = 1, 2, . . . nbks do
25: K[blk]← Discretization()
26: K[blk],K[blk]← Splitting()
27: pK|X,K [blk]← A_Priori_Probabilities_Calculation()
28: end for
29: Ĥ(K),Rcode ← Code_Rate_Calculation()
30: H← LDPC_Code_Generation()











36: if is_hash_verified[blk] then











42: R, r, ñ, ε← Composable_Rate_Calculation()
43: if R > 0 then









We are particularly interested in short-range high-rate
implementations of CV-QKD, over distances of around
5 km in standard optical fiber. Even in this regime of
relatively high SNR, to get a positive value for the com-
posable secret key rate, we need to consider a block size
N of the order of at least 105. The choice of the recon-
ciliation efficiency β is also important, as a positive rate
cannot be achieved when the value of β is too low.
Sample parameters for a positive R are given in Ta-
ble IV. Alice’s signal variance µ is chosen to achieve a tar-
get high value of SNR (e.g., SNR = 12 in Figs. 3 and 4).
As we see from Fig. 3, positive values for the composable
secret key rate are indeed achievable for block sizes with
N > 105 and, as expected, the key rate grows as the
block size increases, while all of the simulations attained
pEC ≥ 0.95. The numerical values of the rate can be
considered to be high, since a key rate of 10−1 bits/use
corresponds to 500 kbits/sec with a relatively slow clock
of 5 MHz. Fig. 4 implies that high rates can be achieved
even with fewer total states Nnbks, when a large block
size, e.g. N = 250000, is fixed and the number of blocks
nblk varies instead. Note that having an adequately large
block size is much more beneficial in obtaining a positive
R than having more blocks of smaller sizes. Having fewer
total states also achieves faster performance, as seen in
Fig. 11.
In Fig. 5, we also show the behavior of the composable
secret key rate versus distance L expressed in km of stan-
dard optical fiber. We adopt the input parameters spec-
ified in Table IV and we use blocks of size N = 2× 105,
with reconciliation efficiency β taking values from 90.25%
to 92.17%. As we can see from the figure, high rates
(around 0.5 bits/use) can be achieved at short distances
(L = 1 km), while a distance of L = 7 km can yield a
rate of about 0.004 bits/use.
In Fig. 6, we analyze the robustness of the protocol
with respect to the amount of untrusted excess noise in
the quantum communication channel (even though this
parameter may also include any other imperfection com-
ing from the experimental setup). As we can see from
the figure, positive key rates are achievable for relatively
high values of the excess noise (ξ = 0.08).
Figs. 7, 8 and 9 explore different quantities of interest
(FER, rate, and EC rounds respectively) as a function
of the SNR and for various choices of the number p of
discretization bits. The parameters used in the simu-
lations are given in Table IV, where µ is variable and
adapted to attain the desired SNR. In particular, in
Figs. 8 and 9, the reconciliation efficiency β (shown in
Table V) is chosen according to the following rationale:
(i) because a regular LDPC code only achieves a specific
value of Rcode, β is chosen so that Rcode from Eq. (79)
matches Rcode of a regular LDPC code with high numer-
ical accuracy; (ii) β is high enough so that a positive key
rate can be achieved for various values of p for the same
SNR; and (iii) β is low enough so that a limited number



















0.91620.91710.91790.91860.9193 0.92 0.9205 0.921 0.92140.9218
Reconciliation Efficiency β
FIG. 3: Composable secret key rate R (bits/use) versus the
block size N for SNR = 12. We compare the rate of Eq. (89)
from five simulations (green points) and their average (blue
line) with the theoretical rate of Eq. (92) (orange line), where
the theoretical guesses for β̃ and p̃EC are chosen compatibly
with the simulations. For every simulation, p̃EC = pEC has
been set. All simulations have achieved pEC ≥ 0.95. The step
of N is 12500. The values of the reconciliation efficiency β
are shown on the top axis and are chosen so as to produce
Rcode ≈ 0.875. See Table IV for the list of input parameters
used in the simulations.
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0.88910.90250.90860.91250.91510.91710.9186 0.92 0.921 0.9218
Reconciliation Efficiency β
FIG. 4: Composable secret key rate R (bits/use) versus the
number of blocks nbks for SNR = 12. The step of nbks is
10. The individual block size is fixed and equal to N = 2.5×
105. Every point represents the average value of R, which is
obtained after 5 simulations. All simulations have achieved
pEC ≥ 0.95. The values of the reconciliation efficiency β are
shown on the top axis and are chosen so as to produce Rcode ≈
0.875. See Table IV for the list of input parameters used in
the simulations.
of EC rounds exceeds the iteration limit itermax (if β is
too high, this limit is exceeded and FER increases or can
even be equal to 1, meaning that no block is correctly
decoded).
Fig. 7 shows the FER for different values of the SNR.
As seen, the FER is higher for lower SNRs and quickly
declines even with a small increase of the SNR. Note
that every simulation, which was executed to produce the
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Parameter Value (Fig. 3) Value (Fig. 4) Value (Fig. 5) Value (Fig. 6) Value (Fig. 7) Value (Figs. 8-9)
L 5 5 variable 4 5 5
A 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
ξ 0.01 0.01 0.01 variable 0.01 0.01
η 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.85 0.8 0.8
υel 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.1
nbks 100 variable 100 100 100 100
N 1.375-2.5 × 105 2.5× 105 2× 105 2.5× 105 2× 105 2.5× 105
M 0.1nbksN 0.1nbksN 0.1nbksN 0.1nbksN 0.1nbksN 0.1nbksN
p 7 7 7 7 7 variable
q 4 4 4 4 4 4
α 7 7 7 7 7 7
itermax 100 100 150 200 150 150
εPE, s, h, ... 2
−32 2−32 2−32 2−32 2−32 2−32
µ ≈ 21.89 ≈ 21.89 20 25 variable variable
TABLE IV: The input parameters for the simulations.


















0.9207 0.9218 0.9210 0.9181 0.9123 0.9030 0.9188
Reconciliation Efficiency β
FIG. 5: Composable secret key rate R (bits/use) versus the
channel length L (km). Here, we use N = 2×105. Every point
represents the average value of R, which is obtained after 5
simulations. All simulations have achieved pEC ≥ 0.95. The
values of the reconciliation efficiency β are shown on the top
axis. Other parameters are taken as in Table IV.
particular data, returned a positive key rate (the high-
est FER attained was FER = 0.95 for SNR = 11.725).
This result suggests that when N is adequately large, a
positive R can be achieved even with a minimal number
of correctly decoded and verified blocks. The plot also
shows the FER for the same simulations, if the maxi-
mum iteration limit had instead been itermax = 100. In
the case of SNR = 11.725, if we had set itermax = 100, a
positive R would not have been realised for some simu-
lations.
Fig. 8 shows the composable key rate R versus SNR for
different discretization values p, while keeping the value
of q constant and equal to 4 (see the list of parameters
in Table IV). As observed, for fixed values of SNR and
β, the lower the p is, the higher the rate R is. For ev-
ery SNR and β, there is a maximum value for p able to


















pEC ∈ [0.94, 0.98]
pEC ∈ [0.90, 0.98]
pEC ∈ [0.94, 1.00]
pEC ∈ [0.93, 0.99]
pEC ∈ [0.92, 0.98]
pEC ∈ [0.93, 0.99]
pEC ∈ [0.88, 0.97]
pEC ∈ [0.57, 0.60]
0.908 0.91 0.912 0.914 0.916 0.918 0.92 0.922
Reconciliation Efficiency β
FIG. 6: Composable secret key rate R (bits/use) versus the
excess noise ξ. Every point represents the average value of
R, which is obtained after 5 simulations. The minimum and
maximum values achieved for pEC fall within the interval dis-
played next to each point. The values of the reconciliation
efficiency β are shown on the top axis and are chosen so as
to produce Rcode ≈ 0.913. Other parameters are taken as in
Table IV.
achieve a positive R. For example, for SNR = 6 and
β ≈ 0.8588 (Rcode ≈ 0.75) a positive R is impossible
to achieve with p ≥ 8. For SNR = 7 and β ≈ 0.8775
(Rcode ≈ 0.777), a positive R is infeasible with p ≥ 9.
The key rate improvement owed to smaller values of p
relies on the fact that a smaller amount of bits d = p− q
are declared publicly, while the protocol maintains a good
EC performance thanks to a sufficiently large number of
EC iterations. On the other hand, by increasing p for a
fixed q, we increase the number of the public d-bits assist-
ing the LDPC decoding via the sum-product algorithm.
This means that the EC step is successfully terminated
in fewer rounds.
14
SNR βp=7 βp=8 βp=9 Rcode dc
6 0.8588 0.75 8
7 0.8788 0.8775 0.777 9
8 0.8868 0.8865 0.8864 0.8 10
9a 0.89 0.8897 0.8896 0.818 11
9b 0.9265 0.9262 0.9261 0.833 12
10 0.9194 0.9190 0.9189 0.846 13
11a 0.9116 0.9113 0.9113 0.857 14
11b 0.9327 0.9326 0.866 15
12 0.9218 0.9215 0.9214 0.875 16
TABLE V: The chosen reconciliation efficiency β for each SNR
of Figs. 8 and 9, together with its respective code rate Rcode
and the row weight dc of the LDPC code. A missing value for
the reconciliation efficiency implies that the returned compos-
able key rate will most likely be negative under the specified
values. The column weight dv remains constant and equal to
2 for all simulations.





















FIG. 7: FER versus SNR for p = 7. The FER is compared
for the same simulations, when the maximum number of EC
iterations is itermax = 150 (blue line) and when itermax =
100 (orange line). Every point represents the average value
of FER, which is obtained after 6 simulations. The step of
the SNR is 0.025. The values of the reconciliation efficiency
β are chosen so as to produce Rcode ≈ 0.875. The signal
variance µ that was used to achieve the respective SNR is
displayed on the top axis with an accuracy of 4 decimal digits.
The average number of iterations fndrnd needed to decode
and verify a block is displayed for every point next to their
respective points. The other parameters are constant and
listed in Table IV. We observe that a slight increase of µ
causes the FER to decline rapidly.
In Fig. 9, we plot the average number of EC rounds
fndrnd required to decode a block versus the SNR, for
different values of p. For a larger value of p, fewer de-
coding rounds are needed. This does not only make the
decoding faster, but, depending on the specified itermax,
it also gives the algorithm the ability to achieve a lower
FER. Thus, a higher p can potentially achieve a better
pEC, while a smaller p may return a better R (assum-



























11.4461 13.1871 14.9281 16.6692 18.4102 20.1512 21.8922
Signal Variance μ
FIG. 8: Composable secret key rate R versus SNR for dis-
cretization bits p = 7, 8, 9. The chosen reconciliation effi-
ciency β, for each value of the SNR, is shown in Table V.
For SNRs = 9 and 11, the solid lines follow the values of the
entries ‘a’ of Table V, while the dashed lines describe the ‘b’
cases. We observe that, for lower values of p (at a fixed q = 4),
we obtain higher rates for the corresponding SNR. The signal
variance µ that was used to achieve the respective SNR is dis-
played on the top axis with an accuracy of 4 decimal digits.
Other parameters are chosen as in Table IV.
ing that itermax is large enough). Therefore, at any fixed
SNR and itermax, one could suitably optimize the proto-
col over the number of discretization bits p.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this manuscript we have provided a complete pro-
cedure for the post-processing of data generated by a nu-
merical simulation (or an equivalent experimental imple-
mentation) of a Gaussian-modulated coherent-state CV-
QKD protocol in the high SNR regime. The procedure
goes into the details of the various steps of parameter es-
timation, error correction and privacy amplification, suit-
ably adapted to match the setting of composable finite-
size security. Together with the development of the the-
oretical tools and the corresponding technical details, we
provide a corresponding Python library that can be used
for CV-QKD simulation/optimization and for the real-
istic post-processing of data from Gaussian-modulated
CV-QKD protocols.
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11.4461 13.1871 14.9281 16.6692 18.4102 20.1512 21.8922
Signal Variance μ
FER ∈ [0.67, 0.86]
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FER = 0.05
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FIG. 9: Average EC rounds fndrnd needed to decode a frame
versus the SNR for p = 7, p = 8 and p = 9. A round is
registered only if the frame passes the verification step. The
chosen reconciliation efficiency β for each value of the SNR is
shown in Table V. For SNR = 9 and SNR = 11 specifically,
the solid lines respectively follow the values of the entry 9a
and 11a of Table V, while the dashed lines describe the 9b
and 11b cases. For the ‘b’ cases, the FER is reported next to
the respective values. The signal variance µ that was used to
achieve the respective SNR is displayed on the top axis with
an accuracy of 4 decimal digits. Other parameters are chosen
as in Table IV.
Appendix A: Alternative formulas for PE
































:= σ2τ . (A2)
Thus the worst-case estimator for the transmissivity T =
τ2 will be given by
Tm =
































The expression above is the same as the one derived in
the main text via Eq. (51)





i ≃ mσ2x, meaning that a sam-
ple of size m from the data is close enough to reproduce















































yielding the worst-case parameter
T ′m =













We then observe that the relation in Eq. (A3) gives a
more pessimistic value for the worst-case transmissivity





x)) which is missing in Eq. (A7).
In our main text we assume the most conservative choice
corresponding to the estimator in Eq. (A3).
Appendix B: Calculations in GF(q)
A Galois field is a field with finite number of elements.
A common way to derive it is to take the modulo of the
division of the integers over a prime number p. The order
of such a field q = pk (with k being a positive integer)
is the number of its elements. All the Galois fields with
the same number of elements are isomorphic and can be
identified by GF(q). A special case is the order q = 2k.
In a field with such an order, each element is associated
with a binary polynomial of degree no more than k − 1,
i.e. the elements can be described as k-bit strings where
each bit of the string corresponds to the coefficient of the
polynomial at the same position. For instance, for the
element 5 of GF(23) we have
101 → x2 + 1.
This is instructive on how the operations of addition and
multiplication are computed in such a field. For example,
the addition of 5 and 6 is made in the following way
101 + 110 → (x2 + 1) + (x2 + x) =
0︷ ︸︸ ︷




As the field is finite, one can also perform the addition





0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 0 3 2 5 4 7 6
2 3 0 1 6 7 4 5
3 2 1 0 7 6 5 4
4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3
5 4 7 6 1 0 3 2
6 7 4 5 2 3 0 1




Subtraction between two elements of GF(2k) gives the
same result as addition, making the two operations equiv-
alent. Multiplication is more complicated, especially
when the result is a polynomial with a degree larger then
k − 1. For example, in GF(23), 7× 6 is calculated as
111× 110 → (x2 + x+ 1)× (x2 + x)
=x4 + x3 + x3 + x2 + x2 + x = x4 + x. (B2)
Because we have a degree 4 polynomial, we need to take
this result modulo an irreducible polynomial of degree 3,
e.g., x3 − x+ 1. Thus, we have
(x4 + x mod x3 − x+ 1) = x2 → 100 → 4, (B3)
where the operation can be made by adopting a long divi-
sion with exclusive OR [37]. Instead, as seen in addition,
multiplication can be performed by using a precomputed
matrix. For instance, in GF(23), the results are specified




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 2 4 6 3 1 7 5
0 3 6 5 7 4 1 2
0 4 3 7 6 2 5 1
0 5 1 4 2 7 3 6
0 6 7 1 5 3 2 4




Appendix C: LDPC decoding
1. Updating the likelihood function
Let us assume a device where its output is described
by the random variable X taking values x according to a
family of probability distributions P(X ; θ) parametrized
by θ. Given the sampled data string Xi for i = 1, . . . , n
from this distribution, one can build a string of data Xn
and define the likelihood of a specific parameter θ de-
scribing the associated probability distribution as




where P (Xn|θ) is the conditional probability for a spe-
cific Xn to come out of the device given that its distribu-
tion is described by θ and the its outcome of the device
is i.i.d. following P(X ; θ). Intuitively, a good guess θ̂ of
the parameter θ would be the argument θ∗ of the maxi-
mization of the likelihood function over θ. Using Bayes’
rule, we may write




and observe that P (Xn) is not dependent on θ and P (θ)
is considered uniform (thus independent of θ). There-
fore, one may maximize P (θ|Xn) instead. Furthermore,
for the simplification of the later discussion one may ex-
press the previous probability as a function being only
dependent from the parameter θ (considering the data
Xi as constants), namely
F (θ) = P (θ|Xn). (C3)
Let us now consider the case where we have a vector
of parameters (variables) ~θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) describing the
distribution P(X |θ). Respectively, one can define the
probability





F (θ1, . . . , θk, . . . , θn). (C5)
Let us now assume that there are certain constraints
that ~θ should satisfy which are summarized by a system
of m linear equations (checks) H~θ = ~z, where H is an
m× n matrix. In particular, there are m equations that
the θi should satisfy in the form of
∑
i
Hjiθi = zj for j = 1, . . . ,m. (C6)
For instance, when ~z = (3, 1, 2), the matrix in Table VI
gives the following three equations [38]:
3θ3 + θ5 =3, (C7)
2θ1 + θ4 =1, (C8)




0 0 3 0 1
2 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 2 3


TABLE VI: An example for a l× n parity check matrix with
values in GF(22) for l = 3 checks (check nodes) and n = 5
transmitted signals (variable nodes). For this matrix, the
assumptions of a regular code explained in Sec. IID are not
valid and it is used only as a toy model for the convenience
of the description for the sum-product algorithm.
17
Then one needs to pass from the (a priori) probability
distribution of Eq. (C4) to
F̃ (~θ) = F (~θ|H~θ = ~z), (C10)
and calculate the respective marginals
F̃ (θi) = F (θi|H~θ = ~z). (C11)





1: Step 1: Initialization
2: ~z ← Klsd
3: j, i← j, i : Hji 6= 0 (Tanner graph creation)
4: fκi ← P (Ki = κ|Xi,Ki)
5: qjiκ ← f
κ
i
6: for iter = 1, 2, . . . itermax do












9: Step 3: Vertical Step









11: Step 4: Tentative Decoding






13: if HK̂n = ~z then
14: return K̂n, fndrnd, fnd← True
15: end if
16: if iter = itermax then




The sum-product algorithm uses the intuition of the
previous analysis to efficiently calculate the marginals
F̃ (Ki) = F (Ki|HKn = K lsd) (C12)
of Eq. (C11) for θi := Ki, ~θ := K
n
, ~z := K lsd and the
a priori marginal probabilities F (Ki = κ) = P (κ|XiKi),
calculated in Eq. (66). To do so, it associates a Tanner
(factor) graph to the matrix H and assumes signal ex-
change between its nodes. More specifically, the graph
consists of two kinds of nodes: n variable nodes repre-
senting the parameters (variables) Ki and m check nodes
representing the linear equations (checks) described by
HK
n
= K lsd. Then, for each variable i that participates
in the jth equation, there is an edge connecting the rel-
evant nodes. At this point, we present an example of
such a Tanner (factor) graph in Fig. 10(a), based on the
matrix H in Table VI. The signal sent from the variable
node i to a factor node j is called qjiκ and is the probabil-
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FIG. 10: a) Tanner graph of the parity check matrix of Ta-
ble VI. The variable (output) nodes (white disks) are con-
nected with the check (syndrome) nodes (black disks) when
Hji 6= 0. b) One instance of the horizontal step (Step 2) of
Algorithm 2. Here, the signal probability r34κ is updated for
all the κ ∈ GF(22) from the contribution (blue arrows) of the
rest of the neighbour variable nodes of check node 3, apart
from the variable node 4 (node in blue). This update will
be repeated in the same step for all the variable nodes, i.e.,
r32κ and r35κ will be calculated too. The same procedure will
be followed for syndrome nodes 1 and 2 before the algorithm
passes to the horizontal step. This description provides the
conceptual steps to derive the desirable result. Practically,
the algorithm follows a more complex path, e.g., calculates
probabilities of partial sums. However, this path gives an ad-
vantage in terms of efficient calculations. c) An instance of
the horizontal step (Step 3) of Algorithm 2. Here the prob-
ability q15κ is updated for all the κ ∈ GF(2
2). It is updated
only from the contribution of syndrome node 3 (green arrow),
while node 1 (node in green) is not participating. This update
will happen for all the syndrome nodes, namely q35κ will be
calculated too. It will be repeated also for all variable nodes,
before the tentative decoding (Step 4) is going to start.
are true, apart from equation j. The signal sent from
the check node j to the variable node i is called rjiκ and
is equal with the probability of equation j to be satis-
fied, if the variable Ki = κ. Note that, based on these
definitions, the marginals of Eq. (C12) are given by
F̃ (Ki = κ) = qjiκrjiκ, (C13)
for any equation j that the variable i takes part in.
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In particular, in each iteration, the algorithm updates
the rjiκ (horizontal step) through the signals of the neigh-
bour variable nodes apart from the signal from node i by
the following rule: given a vector K
n
where its ith ele-












] takes the value 1, if the check j
is satisfied from K
n
, or 0 if it is not. Note that the
values of qjkKk are initially updated with the a priori
probabilities during the initialization step (see line 5 of
Algorithm 2) and that N (j) are the set of neighbours of
the jth check node. An example of such an update is
depicted in Fig. 10(b).
In fact, the algorithm takes advantage of the fact that
rjiκ = Prob
[











are partial sums with different direction running over the
jth check. More specifically, Eq. (C15) can be further
simplified into a sum of a product of probabilities of the
previous partial sums taking specific values by satisfying
the jth check, as in line 10 of the pseudocode of Algo-
rithm 2. Then, the algorithm updates the qjiκ through
the signals coming from the neighbour check nodes apart
from node j, as depicted for the example in Fig. 10(c).
The rule to do so is given in line 12 of the pseudocode
(vertical step). Finally, in the tentative decoding step,
the algorithm takes the product of qjiκ and rjiκ, then cal-
culates and maximizes the marginal of Eq. (C13) over κ.
The arguments K̂i of this maximization of every marginal
create a good guess K̂n for K
n
. In the next iteration, the
algorithm follows the same steps, using the previous qijκ
to make all the updates.
Appendix D: Toeplitz matrix calculation with
Fast-Fourier Transform
The time complexity of the dot product between a
Toeplitz matrix T and a sequence x is O(ñ2). This com-
plexity can be reduced to O(ñ log ñ) using the definition
of a circulant matrix and the FFT. A circulant matrix
C is a special case of the Toeplitz matrix, where every
row of the matrix is a right cyclic shift of the row above
it [39]. Such a matrix is always square and is completely
defined by its first row Cdef.
The steps are as follows [40]:
• The Toeplitz matrix is reformed into a circulant
matrix by merging its first row and column to-
gether. Since the former has dimensions ñ × r,
where ñ is the privacy amplification block length
and r is the length of the final key, the length of
the definition of the latter becomes ñ+ r − 1.
• The decoded sequence to be compressed is ex-
tended, as r − 1 zeros are padded to its end. The
length of the new sequence Sext is now equal to the
length of the circulant matrix definition.
• To efficiently calculate the key, an optimized mul-
tiplication is carried out as
F−1[F(Sext) ∗ F(Cdef)] (D1)
where F represents the FFT and F−1 stands for the
inverse FFT. Because of the convolution theorem,
the ∗ operator signifies the Hadamard product and
therefore element-wise multiplication can be per-
formed.
• As the key format is required to be in bits, the
result of the inverse FFT is taken modulo 2.
• The key K is constituted by the first r bits of the
resulting bit string of length ñ+ r − 1.
Appendix E: Software benchmarks
The benchmarks for the entire runtime duration and
the peak memory consumption, with regards to differ-
ent sizes for the N and nbks variables, are portrayed in
Fig. 11. Around 95% of the runtime is ascribed to the
duration of the non-binary sum-product algorithm, while
the heavy memory load is predominantly because of the
privacy amplification stage. The slow speed of the de-
coding stage is justified, as the non-binary sum-product
algorithm is complex in nature. In addition, in order to
achieve a positive composable key rate, the block sizes
have to be sufficiently large (N > 105) and an adequate
number of blocks has to be present as well.
For such a computational task, we employed the In-
teractive Research Linux Service of University of York,
whose specifications are noted in Table VII. Neverthe-
less, the software is able to run on a conventional com-
puter as well; however, the speed will be significantly
diminished. To provide algorithmic speedups we used
various techniques, which include, but are not limited to
the Numba library, parallelization, the use of dictionary
structures (whose lookup time complexity is O(1)) and
precomputed tables for the Galois field computations.
An advantage of the sum-product algorithm is that it
is parallelizable. Therefore, possessing more processing
cores is beneficial in terms of speed and, consequently,
such projects are often carried out on Graphical Process-
ing Units (GPUs) [21] because of their superior number
of cores compared to Central Processing Units (CPUs).
To provide massive compatibility, the software is written
to target solely CPUs. Future versions of the software
may process the error correction stage on a GPU level.
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FIG. 11: Computational benchmarks: Entire duration of a simulation (left) and peak memory consumption (right). These
are provided with respect to a variable block size N (in blue) and a variable number of blocks nbks (in orange). When N is
variable, the number of blocks is constant and equal to nbks = 100. When nbks is variable, the block size is constant and equal
to N = 250000. The results depicted are based on the simulations of Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, respectively (whose corresponding sets
of parameters can be found in Table IV). In order to successfully decode a block, around 40 iteration rounds are required on
average.
CPU Model Intel Xeon E5-2680 v4
CPU Clock Speed 2.60 GHz




TABLE VII: The specifications of the system, on which the
simulations were executed.
In addition, the non-binary sum-product method used
in this paper is anachronistic in terms of speed. There
exists a newer method, which replaces the stages that de-
mand the most complexity with FFT computations [41].
Future improvements on the algorithm could potentially
include this method as well.
Generating a shared secret key K for a particular set
of noise parameters in a quick manner is a matter of op-
timization of the block size, the number of blocks and
the discretization bits. Let us examine the well-studied
case of SNR = 12. In Sec. IV, it is explained that se-
lecting a small number of blocks with a large block size
over a large number of blocks with a smaller block size
is beneficial for the key rate. Furthermore, in Fig. 9, it
is shown that p = 8 provides a reasonable boost in the
error-correction speed. On the contrary, choosing p = 9
offers little advantage when the average number of it-
erations is already small; however the key rate sacrifice
is large. Under Rcode = 0.875 and p = 8, the algorithm
needs around 32.5 iterations on average to decode a block.
Taking all the above into consideration, a simulation with
the parameters N = 352000, nbks = 5 and p = 8 can pro-
duce a key with a composable key rate of around 10−4
bits/use and a delay time of less than 30 minutes.
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